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Faced with massive infrastructure needs, the private ﬁnance initiative (PFI) has gained 
renewed attention from the development community. Between 1990 and 2005 alone, US$71 
billion were invested by the private sector in 392 projects in 26 developing countries. A 
notable trend in this development is that PFIs are more prevalent in developing countries 
than in developed countries. This is due in part to the more severe budgetary constraints 
developing countries are facing, and also due to the fact that main cost elements such 
as labor, materials and land are still low in price in developing countries, while unit 
construction costs per km have already become prohibitively high in developed countries, 
as exempliﬁed in Japan.1 
However, strong skepticism still exists about the applicability of the PFI approach 
to developing countries, particularly in Asia. This is largely due to the following intrinsic 
difﬁculties associated with highway development:
　 Risks associated with land acquisition and construction;
　 Lumpy initial capital investments and the resultant long gestation period; and
　 Difﬁculties in trafﬁc forecast and associated uncertainties in future revenue ﬂow.
These have led to another set of difﬁculties, i.e.: 
　 securing long term loans from ﬁnancial institutions;
　 delays in construction; and 
　 cash ﬂow problems during the initial years of operation when debt service payments 
have started (after the end of the period of grace), but toll revenue has not yet picked 
up enough to service the debts. 
Addressing these problems requires government intervention through the provision 
of: (i) subsidies to capital investments so as to lighten the initial burden of these investments 
to a level manageable by the investors; (ii) annuities to project companies; or (iii) minimum 
revenue guarantee to those companies. These government interventions in private ﬁnance 
initiatives have amounted to the emergence of a new form of public private partnership 
(PPP), a hybrid form of infrastructure ﬁnance which is primarily based on the PFI in the 
form of build-operate-transfer (BOT) or annuity concessions, but which is supported by 
1 An earlier version of this report was prepared for the Workshop on PPP in India when the author worked 
for the Asian Development Bank as a Principal Transport Specialist. The material was distributed to the 
workshop participants, but it was not published. The original paper was primarily based on the ﬁndings 
of research which the author conducted in Washington DC in March 2005, but it has been substantially 
updated to include more recent developments. 
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the public sector through subsidies, annuities, or guarantees.
As its name implies, PPPs encompass various types of cooperation between the 
public and private sectors. One well-known type of PPP involves the so-called “third 
sector,” which in the context of Japan means joint corporations in which both the public 
and private sectors invest. The third sector approach has been mostly applied to public 
services (such as local railway services) which were not viable ﬁnancially, but still 
needed socially. While the third sector involves the participation of the private sector in 
the provision of managerial capacity and ﬁnancial resources, the management of third 
sector initiatives has often been inefﬁcient due to the need for agreement between their 
public and private shareholders, which may take time to achieve due to conﬂicts of views 
between government institutions and private sector companies. The third sector approach 
has often ended up combining the inefﬁciencies of both worlds, i.e. the bureaucracy of the 
public sector and the higher ﬁnancing costs of the private sector. 
In contrast, the new form of PPP referred to above is entirely managed by the 
private sector, while public sector intervention is limited to the provision of the necessary 
ﬁnancial assistance. In other words, while the third sector approach is based on the public 
sector provision of services supplemented by the private sector, the BOT-based PPP is 
basically a private sector initiative, supported by the public sector through the provision 
of subsidies or guarantees to project companies. The discussion in this paper focuses 
entirely on this latter form of PPP, namely the BOT-based PPP.
Comparison of Performance Between Public and Private Sector-Led Schemes
Infrastructure has traditionally been developed and operated by the public sector. For 
those governments considering a shift from the conventional public sector ﬁnancing 
scheme to a BOT-PPP scheme, the ﬁrst question to be asked by the public (whether in 
the national Parliament or municipal general assembly) is whether the BOT-PPP scheme 
would provide better performance than the traditional public sector ﬁnance. This question 
is particularly relevant since the public authorities can mobilize funds in a less costly 
manner than the private sector. In addition, the current competitive bidding-scheme for 
the engagement of contractors works relatively well in securing low cost construction. If 
the disadvantage of the public procurement system is the non-inclusion of a budget for 
operation and maintenance (O&M), this can be put out to tender separately by competitive 
bidding. It can be further argued that the combination of these two contracts may provide 
a superior alternative to a BOT scheme since it would provide a simpler form of contract 
and thus take less time for negotiations. 
These arguments against BOT schemes may be valid in many cases, and one should 
be aware that shifting to a PPP or BOT scheme will not always be the best choice among 
the various policy options available to the public authorities. However, it should also be 
noted that a BOT-PPP scheme has several major advantages over a public sector ﬁnancing 
scheme. As often noted a major advantage of the BOT scheme is that the combined 
provision of construction and later O&M enables BOT operators to design the facilities 
in such a manner as to minimize the life cycle costs of the construction and operation 
of the infrastructure, and thus enhance the operational efﬁciency of the project. Other 
beneﬁts would include the efﬁciency of intervention of the ﬁnanciers once a problem 
happens. Usually the private sector ﬁnanciers have a “step in” clause which enables them 
to intervene quickly in the management of a company managing a failed project so as 
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to prevent a default. This may prevent disruption of BOT service provision in a more 
effective manner than intervention by the public sector, which is often slow in decision 
making and less capable in dealing with managerial issues in the project companies. The 
strongest beneﬁt of the BOT scheme (if structured correctly as indicated in a “viability gap 
funding” or VGF scheme) lies in closing a hidden loophole in public sector procurement. 
A major problem with public sector procurement derives from the fact that the contract 
will usually be won by the lowest bidder. Tactics that experienced bidders often employ is 
to bid low (often lower than cost price) and win the contract, and then claim for the higher 
costs incurred later, by requesting compensation for “variations to contracts.” 
As seen above, both public procurement and BOT-PPP systems have advantages and 
disadvantages, and thus there is no way to resolve the question of which is superior. The 
only way to conclude this discussion is to compare the real world performance of these 
two systems on the basis of speciﬁc cases. In this regard, an analysis was conducted in 
2007 by PricewaterhouseCoopers of India (PwC) following a request from the Highway 
Authority of India (NHAI)2. The key ﬁndings of the survey are summarized in the 
following paragraphs.
The Government of India (GOI) decided in 1998 to upgrade three major arterial 
highways to four-lane standard, totaling 13,000 km. The principal mechanism employed 
by NHAI in the construction of these highways was engineering procurement construction 
(EPC)3 under a public sector ﬁnancing scheme. A smaller number of projects were 
implemented using two forms of private sector ﬁnancing scheme, namely BOT and 
annuity concession schemes. From these arterial highways, completed sections amounting 
to 5,000kms of road from 150 projects were selected for the survey. Thus, the size of the 
sample in the survey by PricewaterhouseCooper was 150, including 135 EPC contracts, 
8 BOT contracts and 7 annuity concessions. The average length of the highways covered 
by each EPC contract was 31km, half of that covered by each BOT or annuity contract 
(both with an average length of 60km). The major ﬁndings can be summarized as follows 
(see Table 1): 
　 The performance of BOT is far superior to other forms ofcontract in terms of cost 
effectiveness and delivery time. At the time of the completion, construction costs 
were 30% lower than EPC and 57% lower than annuity schemes. BOT construction 
was completed one month earlier than the original schedule, in sharp contrast to the 
average 16-month delays in EPC contract and 3-month delays in annuity contracts. 
　 Annuity contracts were less impressive but still performed better than the EPC 
contracts, being completed 13 months faster on average. Construction costs were 
18% higher than with EPC ﬁnance, but this was due to the inclusion of O&M costs, 
which often exceed 20% of the construction costs if a concession period of 12 years 
is taken into consideration.
2 The author obtained the results of the analysis from the NHAI in the course of discussions on a proposed 
Public Private Partnership Project for the National Highway Development Program to be ﬁnanced the by 
Asian Development Bank in which the author served as a task manager. The key ﬁndings of the analysis 
were discussed by the NHAI and the ADB mission, and it was agreed to include them in the Project 
Appraisal Document (PAD) for the Project. Unfortunately, while the project was ready for presentation, 
the ADB Board decided to delay submission, and the PAD has not yet beeen made available to the 
public.
3 While NHAI often refers this contract as an EPC, it is more exactly termed an “item rate contract”. 
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　 EPC contracts exhibited the poorest performance. Particularly problematic was 
the delay in delivery time, of 16 months on average from the original schedule. 
Furthermore, the contractors charged NHAI 20% more than the original contract 
prices through changes to the original contracts. This ﬁgure coincides with the UK 
government ﬁnding that contractors generally charge 20% more than the original 
contract prices. 
The above ﬁndings provide a clear justiﬁcation for the GOI to move to BOT-PPP schemes, 
away from the traditional item rate contracts using public sector ﬁnancing. The GOI has 
also indicated the clear preference for BOT schemes over annuity concessions because of 
their relative performance indicated above. 























EPC 31.0 $24m 20% $0.9m/km 16.0 months 135
BOT 60.0 $71m -44%* $0.7m/km -1.1 months* 8
Annuity 59.5 $65m 3% $1.1m/km** 3.3 months 7
Sources: NHAI, PricewaterhouseCooper
*After adjusting for one extreme case
** Per km construction costs include O&M costs
Exchange rate $1=Rp45
Review of Key Elements of the BOT/PPP Operations
(1) Comparison between public and private procurement process 
Procurement process for publicly ﬁnanced projects: While PFIs cover a wide spectrum of 
private sector participation, including: (i) service contracts; (ii) management contracta; (iii) 
leasing; (iv) concessions; and (v) privatization, the second generation PPPs primarily focus 
on concessions, particularly BOT schemes. The process of selection of BOT contractors 
and the subsequent process are signiﬁcantly different from those of the traditional public 
sector ﬁnance schemes. Under traditional schemes, a contractor is selected through 
competitive bidding, either national or international. Design requirements are speciﬁed in 
a detailed design (DD) by the government, the executing agency. Bidders compete with 
each other in the rates for each item indicated in Bills of Quantity to be speciﬁed in the 
bidding documents (“item rate contract”). The typical process is illustrated in Table 2.
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Table 2. Typical process for public sector projects ﬁnanced by a multilateral aid 
agency (e.g. ADB)
Stage no Stage Agent
1 Project identiﬁcation Listed in Country 
Partnership Strategy
2 Formulation of a project Executing agency (EA)
3 Appraisal & decision to 
ﬁnance
ADB
4 Detailed design & bidding 
documentary preparation
EA with assistance of 
consultants
5 Competitive bidding 
(procurement)
Selection of a winning 
contractor by EA
6 Construction (disbursement 
of loan)
The contractor
7 Operation & Maintenance 
(O&M)
The EA
Procurement process of BOT concession: The typical process of BOT selection, together 
with the subsequent processes, usually runs as follows. Since the concessionaire is 
responsible for both construction and O&M of the facilities, the concessionaire develops 
the facility taking into account the minimum life cycle cost elements. Because of this 
factor, the government usually does not specify detailed design requirements, letting the 
private sector design the facilities by themselves so as to let them to have ﬂexibility for 
innovation. The bidding process starts with preliminary selection of bidders, followed 
by the usual process of competitive bidding. Depending on the size of the BOT project, 
a bidder usually forms a consortium of participating companies (called sponsors) in its 
preparation of the bid. 
Once the bid is awarded, the consortium will form a special purpose company (SPC) 
with the intention to “ring-fence” the assets of sponsors from possible seizure in case of 
default. With the establishment of the SPC, the sponsors become the SPC shareholders 
so that their liabilities are limited to the amount of shares they have invested in it. The 
SPC is a legal entity which assumes all responsibilities and obligations associated with 
the delivery and implementation of the project. Construction and O&M are carried out by 
subcontractors, who are often shareholders in the SPC. 
Core functions of the SPC are: (i) securing ﬁnance, (ii) collecting tolls; and (iii) 
paying debts. If the project makes money, the SPC will pay dividends to shareholders on 
an after-tax basis. This means that shareholders will be paid only after all debts are served 
and taxes are paid, but proﬁt still remains. While sponsors are often required to cover 
30- 40% of the project cost, it is not unusual to cover only 10% in case of a large project. 
The deal debt-equity ratio is determined in consideration of a trade-off between the cost 
of ﬁnance and the yield to investment. If the equity portion is higher, the cost of ﬁnance 
will be lower. 
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(2) Solicited versus unsolicited bids 
As indicated above, private sector projects are usually selected through competitive 
bidding. However there are some cases in which they are selected through a different 
system. This occasionally happens in case where private sector companies come up with 
a completely new project concept which can bring major beneﬁts to the communities 
through innovation. The project concept can be truly innovative, or it can be a mere trial 
to sell the companies’ products. In the latter case, the government should look into the 
proposal very carefully, but some governments may not have the necessary institutional 
capacity to evaluate the beneﬁts of the projects. Even if the project seems an excellent 
one, the government may not be able to award a contract to the proposers of of the project, 
either due to the lack of transparency in the selection process, or because it lacks the basis 
to judge whether the estimated cost of the project is appropriate or not. 
 In order to deal with those cases, a speciﬁc procedure has been has been devised 
called “Swiss Challenge.” Under this scheme, potential bidders are given an opportunity 
to bid and submit their estimates in relation to the original proposal. If these potential 
bidders come up with a bid offering a lower price, the original proposers will be given 
another chance to rebid to match the lowest price bid. If they come up with the same price 
or a price which can beat the lowest bidder, they win the contract. After this process, the 
government can award a contract to the original proposer as a reward for its innovative 
ideas. There are a few examples of this type of award in the Philippines. 
 (3) Project ﬁnance 
As stated earlier, the new form of PPP is primarily based on BOT or annuity concession 
schemes. Under these schemes, the project company has to mobilize the necessary funds 
through borrowing from banks or issuing bonds. Since these are critical elements of the 
success of the BOT-PPP scheme, a signiﬁcant portions of this section is allocated to a 
discussion of the project ﬁnance issuem based on the experience in India, where the 
author has been closely involved in the process as a task manager, from the initial stage 
of PPP conceptualization to its operational stage. 
Corporate ﬁnance vs project ﬁnance:A traditional way of ﬁnancing investment is “corporate 
ﬁnance” under which sponsors will borrow the money from banks by: (i) offering the 
creditworthiness of the sponsoring companies as a security for the payment of the entire 
debt; (ii) pledging their net assets as collateral for the payback of loans to creditors (often 
called “balance sheet ﬁnance”); or (iii) offering speciﬁc assets as a recourse for the 
payback of the loan (“asset backed ﬁnance”). However, if the size of the investment is 
large and associated risks of defaulting are high, sponsoring companies generally prefer 
“project ﬁnance,” in which the project company (which is generally formed by sponsors) 
mobilizes necessary funds by pledging to lenders the future revenue ﬂow to be generated 
by the assets created by the project. This is often referred to as “non recourse ﬁnance,” 
since no assets are pledged as a recourse for the payback. 
Experience with the NHDP program in India indicates that, if the size of projects is 
less than $50 million, the project companies often mobilize the necessary funds under a 
corporate ﬁnance scheme. If the project is larger than $50 million, the project companies 
appear to prefer project ﬁnance. 
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High transaction costs: Due to the complexity associated with project ﬁnance and 
associated risk mitigation measures, transaction costs tend to be very high. This is 
further compounded by the complexity of BOT contracts combining two different sorts 
of activities in one package, e.g. (i) short term construction activities and (ii) long-term 
O&M. Negotiations between the government authorities and the project company often 
take more than a year, as exempliﬁed by BOT negotiations for urban transport projects 
in Bangkok in the 1990s. Given this tendency towards long negotiations, the GOI has 
developed a model BOT contract for the national highway subsector. While the model 
contract is a little too complicated in structure for sector-wide application (particularly 
with regard to fee structure), it has contributed signiﬁcantly to the reduction of time for 
negotiations. Actually no modiﬁcations are allowed except for areas clearly identiﬁed in 
the model contracts. An important thing to be noted is that in spite of the rigidity of model 
contract provisions, many private sector contractors have participated in the bidding. The 
truth is that, if there is no possibility of amendment, private sector companies simply give 
up and do not try to spend or waste their time on modiﬁcation of the model clauses. 
(4) Credit Enhancement Measures 
As stated earlier, the BOT and annuity concession schemes mobilize funds through 
borrowing from ﬁnancial institutions, and through other ﬁnancing methods including 
issuance of bonds. This often requires a variety of credit enhancement measures or risk 
mitigation measures so as to alleviate the concerns of ﬁnanciers. Some of the major credit 
enhancement mechanisms often applied to highway projects are listed below. 
Minimum revenue guarantee: Whatever efforts are made, demand forecasts can be 
potentially wrong for any project, but this risk appears to be particularly great for 
highway projects as stated in the 1989 report of the Federal Highway Administration, US 
Department of Transportation. The FHA report pointed out that the trafﬁc forecasts had 
been consistently overstated, while the cost estimates had been consistently understated. 
This tendency was called “optimism bias” by the World Bank.4. This intrinsic difﬁculty 
associated with trafﬁc forecasts constitutes a major risk with highway projects, which 
has made ﬁnanciers hesitant to lend money to these projects. Since this has been a major 
deterrent to BOT-based highway projects, several countries such as Chile, Korea, South 
Africa, and Argentina have introduced a minimum revenue guarantee system for qualiﬁed 
highway projects/programs with the aim of facilitating project ﬁnance by the project 
companies. 
Under this scheme, the Government ﬁrst sets its trafﬁc projections, or revenue 
projections for each year of operation. If the level of trafﬁc or revenue is less than a certain 
threshold (for example, 80%) of the trafﬁc/revenue projected, the government will pay 
the shortfall between the level realized and the threshold. This minimum risk guarantee 
is usually combined with a revenue sharing scheme as a counterbalance in the case of a 
higher-than-projected trafﬁc level. If the level exceeds a corresponding upward threshold 
(for example, 120% of the trafﬁc/revenue), the additional revenues will be shared equally 
4 Because of this, international ﬁnanciers accept only those trafﬁc forecasts carried out by a dozen 
internationally recognized consulting ﬁrms as a basis for the revenue projection for the highway projects 
in question.
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between the government and the project company. This minimum revenue guarantee 
system has enormously facilitated ﬁnancing by the project companies, but there are still 
many governments reluctant to adopt this system because of their wish to avoid assuming 
contingent liability. 
Foreign exchange risk guarantee: Another major deterrent for foreign investments in the 
highway sector is the currency mismatch between toll revenue and foreign investments. 
Since this has constituted a factor discouraging foreign investors, a limited number of 
governments of developing countries have introduced foreign exchange risk guarantees, 
including the Chilean government. In the case of India, since many of the BOT projects 
have been implemented by domestic companies and there is less need to resort to foreign 
investors, the Indian government has not been enthusiastic to date about promoting foreign 
direct investment in highway project by offering this guarantee. 
Partial credit guarantee: Because of the perceived commercial risks of infrastructure 
projects, the ﬁnanciers may not be willing to provide a loan on the terms required to 
ensure the ﬁnancial viability of the project. The partial credit guarantee (PCG) provides 
comprehensive coverage for all commercial risks for a speciﬁed portion of the borrowing 
through the payment of fees to PCG providers. The PCG typically covers debt service 
portions accruing during later maturities for which lenders are not willing to provide such 
long cover. PCGs are provided by multilateral aid agencies such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and International Finance Corporation (IFC). In the case of the ADB, the 
guarantee fee is 0.4% (40 basis points) for a public sector ﬁnanced project, together with 
a front-end fee. 
Political risk guarantee: Political Risk Guarantees (PRGs) cover payback of all or part of 
the project debt in relation to speciﬁc political risks. The guarantee is activated if any of 
the following events (or any combination of them) takes place:
　 currency inconvertibility and/or non-transfer;
　 conﬁscation, expropriation, nationalization, or deprivation of project assets;
　 political violence, such as strikes or civil disturbances, terrorism, and sabotage that 
negatively affects the project; and 
　 breach of contract, such as non-delivery by state-owned entities of inputs, or 
nonpayment for outputs (e.g., power or water) 
PRGs are well suited to cases in which ﬁnanciers are willing to take on the commercial 
risks of a project, but which require assistance from a multilateral aid agency in 
mitigating the above political risks. PRGs will be provided by multilateral aid agencies 
such as the ADB and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In the 
case of the ADB, the PRG fee is 0.4% (40 basis point) together with the front-end fee 
and the stand-by fee.
Monoline services: For large infrastructure projects such as those over $500 million, 
bonds are the most efﬁcient way of mobilizing the necessary funds for investment. 
However, if the project is BOT-based, the cost of the bond would be very high because 
of the difﬁculties of recourse and resultant low credit rating. However, if all the risks 
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are covered by a reputable guarantor, the credit rating will be upgraded and the cost 
of issuing the bond will be immensely reduced. An innovative mechanism which has 
recently emerged is a guarantee by ﬁnancial insurance companies. Since this insurance 
is applied only to the bond, this insurance service is often called a “monoline service” as 
opposed to “multiline” insurance services which cover a variety of business activities. 
This service is the commitment of ﬁnancial insurance companies to pay utomatically 
both principal and interest of the bonds to their subscribers in the event of the failure of 
the issuer to do so. The effect of this is an immediate jump in the credit rating of the bond 
from whatever rating was originally given to it by the ﬁnancial insurance companies. For 
instance, if a non-investment graded bond (say a BB+ rated bond) is guaranteed by an 
AAA rated ﬁnancial insurance company (such as MBIA or XL Capital), the bond would 
also be upgraded to AAA. Of course, this insurance service is costly (several percent), 
and thus the ﬁnancial insurers recommend the bond issuers to get PCG and PRG from 
multilateral aid agencies such as the MIGA, IFC, or ADB. This would signiﬁcantly lower 
the premiums to be paid by the bond issuers to the ﬁnancial insurance companies. Once 
covered by these guarantees, they are willing to insure the possible default on the payback 
of debt services. The whole process of structuring this product is described in Table 3 
below. This table is also useful in illustrating the process of project formulation and the 
resultant higher credit rating of the project. 
Table 3. Measures to improve credit ratings of infrastructure projects
Initial rating of project Steps to be taken to enhance the rating
Non-investment grade Improvement of ways to package or structure 
the project, based on the advisory services 
to be provided with regard to ﬁnancing 
structure, risk allocation/mitigration, 
safeguards for environmental and social 
development issues, legal structure, and 
implementation arrangements
Close to, but not yet, investment grade 
(“BB+”)
“Partial credit guarantee” and/or “policial risk 
guarantee” to be provided by multilaterals
Investment grade (“BBB-”) Guarantee to be provided by a AAA rated 
ﬁnancial insurer for the possible default by 
the project company to pay interest and/or 
principle
Insured bond (Global AAA)
Major Types of BOT Concession 
Over the last three decades, the PPP schemes have evolved from a simple BOT model to 
a highly sophisticated structured model. While various categorizations would be possible, 
the classiﬁcation based on the selection criteria for BOT operators provids the most 
straightforward explanation. In this section, this will be discussed in relation to highway 
projects. 
－158－
Tolls: The most frequent competition parameter applied in BOT concessions is the least 
amount of tolls to be charged to users. This arrangement enables the government to select 
the most cost efﬁcient service provider and let them to provide the general public with the 
services delegated to the private sector. Since the operation would entail service provision 
over a period of time (often more than 20 years), the concession agreement usually 
includes a safeguard provision against potential inﬂation by linking the level of tolls to 
either the consumer price index or the wholesale price index. To provide a better service, 
an increasing number of BOT operators have introduced electronic tolling systems, but 
tolling systems should be a combination of manual and electronic tolling, since the latter 
requires all vehicles to carry tags, which should not be imposed on a facility which should 
be open to all types of users. This toll-based method sometimes results in a situation in 
which the tolls are too high for the public to pay. If this happens, the government has to 
set a ceiling for the maximum level of tolls to be charged to the users. If the ceiling is too 
low to recover the cost of toll road operation, the government has to provide a subsidy. 
In that case, the amount of subsidy will become a selection criterion in the selection of 
BOT operators. 
Capital grant: A major problem of the PFI based highway development is high initial 
capital costs to be incurred for the development of toll roads. To reduce the size of the 
investment to a level manageable by the private sector, the government often provides a 
grant to the project company so that the operator can set the toll at a level affordable for 
users. The private company requiring the lowest grant from the Government wins the bid. 
The grant could all be paid at the time of commencement of the contract, or it can be paid 
as the construction progresses. Alternatively, the grant could be paid in phases, say 60% 
during the construction and 40% during the O&M stage, so that the client maintains the 
necessary control over both construction and maintenance periods. 
Annuities: Following the technical evaluation, the winning bidder is selected on the basis 
of the ﬁnancial proposal requiring the lowest annuity payments from the government. 
The unique element of this scheme is that the government payment of annuities will 
start only after the completion of construction, i.e. once the asset has been constructed to 
speciﬁed standards, so as to provide an incentive for the early completion of construction. 
A common form of the annuity scheme is that, while the project company physically 
collects tolls, they cannot be retained as its own revenue, but have to be transferred to the 
government. This means that, although the annuity scheme is often described as a form 
of PFI, the project company does not assume any trafﬁc risk, but only the construction 
risk. Furthermore, all the estimated construction and O&M costs will be paid by the 
government, but in the form of installments. This facilitates borrowing from lenders. This 
annuity concept was primarily developed in India. In the current version of the model 
contract for the annuity scheme, the NHAI can choose another option which allows the 
project company to retain tolls as its own revenue. This acts to lower the amount of annuity 
to be paid by the client, and also lets the contractors assume a part of the commercial risks. 
The Chilean Government adopted a scheme similar to the latter variant, four concessions 
for the development of southern sections of Route 5. 
Financial viability gap fund: In contrast to the above schemes in which cost recovery is 
the main thrust, the ﬁnancial viability gap fund was primarily designed for securing the 
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necessary funds for servicing debts. In terms of a cash ﬂow perspective, the project will 
be sustainable as long as it can generate the amount of the money to cover debt services. 
The essential element of the ﬁnancial viability gap fund is that, if the revenue falls short 
of generating the funds to cover debt services, the gap between the toll revenue and debt 
services would be paid by the government in the form of an annuity. 
While this was the original form of viability gap fund (VGF) scheme devised by 
the Ministry of Roads, Transport, and Highways (MoRTH) in 2003, the current form of 
VGF has changed to one similar to the capital grant approach. Under the current form, 
the government would pay the VGF in several payments but only after the equity of the 
project company has been used up. In addition, the amount of the VGF the government 
would pay is limited to the amount the ﬁnanciers would disburse for each period of time. 
If the amount of VGF exceeds 20% of capital expenditure, that portion would be paid 
only during the O&M period. Under the current rule, the maximum amount of VGF to 
be paid is limited to 40%. This can be further increased if special permission from the 
MoRTH is obtained, but this is still rare until now.
Length of the concession period and “least present value of revenue”: Many of the above 
concession schemes presume a ﬁxed concession period. Establishing a ﬁxed concession 
period entails both two kinds of risks. If the trafﬁc is lower than projected, the length of 
concession may not be sufﬁcient for the project company to recover capital costs. If the 
trafﬁc is higher than estimated, the project company might earn excess proﬁts. To address 
this problem, a “least present value of revenue” (LPVR) system was developed. Under 
this scheme, the winner is the project company which claims the lowest value of toll 
revenue to be received throughout the concession period. The concession ends when the 
value of the toll revenue (discounted at a predetermined rate set in the contract) equals the 
concessionaire’s bid. Under this scheme, the concessionaire cannot claim that it cannot 
recover the costs, since the period of concession is extended until the concessionaire is 
able to earn LPVR. This scheme can substantially reduce the possible chances of default, 
which in turn, reduces the cost of borrowing from ﬁnanciers. A possible disadvantage of 
this scheme is that its risk reduction features can make the concessionaire indifferent to 
demand enhancement measures. This scheme was applied by the Chilean Government for 
a BOT project, the Santiago-Valparaiso highway with an estimated cost of $400 million 
in 1998. 
Shadow toll: This terminology is somewhat misleading, as the concept does not involve 
any actual levy of toll to road users. This concept was developed based on the fact that 
the project companies would be paid in accordance with the number of vehicles passing 
through the project roads at an agreed rate per vehicle km (“shadow toll”). The competition 
parameter which the bidders use to compete is the lowest amount of shadow toll. This 
scheme was introduced ﬁrst in the UK to provide incentives to the project companies to 
provide user oriented infrastructure services for non-tollable roads. However, few projects 
have adopted this scheme because of the high transaction costs coupled with a relatively 
small beneﬁt. 
Global PPP/PFI Experiences
PPP/PFIs have been applied globally since the 1970s. But, the experience to date is 
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mixed; some are successful and some are total failures. This section reviews selected 
cases in various countries and highlights key elements to provide a quick overview of 
world experience in the highway sector. 
(1) The Mexican experience
In 1989, the Mexican government announced a major development program of 6,000 km 
of toll roads, with an estimated cost of $16 billion. In the ﬁve years from 1990 to 1994, the 
government granted 52 BOT concessions, covering 5,500 km of the network. Thirty of 
these contracts were directly awarded to private concessionaires, while the remaining 22 
contracts were delegated to state governments for further private sector concessioning. 
In order to create an immediate and visible impact on the ever-worsening trafﬁc 
congestion, the government adopted a rather unusual selection criterion, the shortest 
concession period instead of the conventional lowest toll criterion. The construction 
industry preferred the shortest concession period criterion since they were primarily 
interested in construction, but not O&M. The result was, as expected, very short concession 
periods, ranging from 8 years to 15 years. This led to enormously high tolls that would 
allow the project companies to recover the project costs in a very short period of time. 
This, however, resulted in the situation that some of the newly built tollroads were almost 
empty, while the parallel untolled roads remain heavily congested, providing no solution 
to the original problem.
Another problem of this program was huge cost overrun, averaging 50% higher 
than the original estimates. All concessions were renegotiated later with agreement being 
reached to lengthen the concession period from the contractual 8-14 years to 30 years. 
This was, however, found insufﬁcient to rescue the project companies. In late 1997, the 
government was forced to devise another rescue plan by assuming all bank liabilities and 
temporary ownership of 23 private sector concessions. This second round of the rescue 
plan cost the government $7.8 billion. The major cost overrun was partly due to peso 
devaluation in 1994, but it was also reported to be due to the fact that the construction 
companies (sponsors for the special purpose company) allegedly inﬂated the costs to 
recover the cost of construction, thus allowing the special purpose company to fail (World 
Bank, “Toolkit for Private sector development for toll roads.”). In this program, tax payers 
were major losers, while the construction and banking companies were able to recoup 
most of the costs. 
A key lesson of the program is that the government has to be wary of the contractor 
driven nature of the BOT program. It should be noted that the BOT concept was originally 
devised by the construction industry at the time when excess capacity of the construction 
industry existed. The government should design the BOT scheme in such a manner to 
ensure that the assets created by BOT contractors are properly operated and maintained.
(2) The Chilean experience
In the early 1990s, the Government of Chile decided to develop 2,000 km of intercity 
expressway networks under a BOT scheme at a total estimated cost of $3.3 billion. 
The program was divided into 12 concession packages, which were put out to tender 
over a ﬁve year period, two in 1994, one in 1995, six in 1996, two in 1997 and one 
in 1998 During this period, the evaluation criteria for the concession had been evolved 
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with several modiﬁcations being added. Initially the criterion was a weighted average of 
several parameters including tolls, subsidies, payment to the state for the operating right 
of the existing infrastructure, and the period of concession. But, due to the complexity 
associated with the simultaneous application of these criteria, they were soon simpliﬁed 
to the lowest toll criterion. Meanwhile, for less proﬁtable projects, the minimum present 
value of revenue criterion was introduced. To enhance the creditworthiness of projects, the 
government introduced a minimum revue guarantee and also an exchange rate guarantee. 
As the competition becomes intense, the tolls proposed by bidders were becoming lower 
and lower, to such an extent that the government worried about the long term ﬁnancial 
viability of the concessions. This led to the introduction of another criterion: a ﬂoor for 
the level of tolls so as to prevent below-cost bids. 
All of these 12 toll road concessions were put in operation one by one over the 
period 1998-2002. Average lapse time between the time of the tender and the start of 
the operation was 4.5 years – eight months from the date the bid was advertised to the 
publication of the award in the government gazette; another eight months for setting 
up the project company and getting construction started; and 33-45 months to complete 
construction and commence full scale operations. In consideration of the comprehensive 
nature of BOT contracts (covering detailed design, construction and O&M stages), this 
represents a fairly efﬁcient operation.
Most of the project companies had experienced difﬁculties in arranging long-
term ﬁnancing during the construction period. Due to the intrinsic risk associated with 
construction, the ﬁnanciers were reluctant to offer a long-term loan to project companies. 
The companies had no choice but to use bridge ﬁnancing during the construction period, 
in spite of the fact that it exposed them to uncertainty before the business base was ﬁrmly 
established. Because of this difﬁculty, the government decided to introduce minimum 
revenue guarantee as discussed earlier. 
While this measure has provided extra comfort to local ﬁnanciers, the project 
companies still encountered another problem: limits on the amount loaned by local banks 
and in access to institutional ﬁnancing on local capital markets. These limitations led the 
government to encourage foreign ﬁnancing by providing a hedge against foreign exchange 
risks. With this instrument, a signiﬁcant amount of money was mobilized through the 
issuance of well-wrapped divestures in foreign capital markets. 
The Chilean program represents a successful case of the PPP scheme. A particularly 
interesting aspect of this experience is the dynamics the process created over the 
years. Before the program started, the private sector did not have full conﬁdence in 
government sponsored PPP programs. However, as the early round of bids went well, 
the conﬁdence of the private sector increased. The resulting higher level of competition 
among bidders allowed the government to shoulder less costs and risks compared with 
the concessionaires. 
(3) The US experiences
In 19th century, most of the US highways (16,000 km) were developed by the private 
sector, but entering the 20th century, the US highway systems were developed by the 
public sector with two notable exceptions in the 1990s. 
Dulles Greenways in Virginia is one of these two exceptions. Since the end of 
19th century, Virginia State laws had not allowed private parties to operate turnpikes or 
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highways. However, this ban was lifted by the Virginia Highway Corporation Act of 1988. 
Under this legal framework, a proposal to develop a 22 km toll road to connect Dulles 
International Airport to Loudon County in Virginia was approved. The total project cost 
was $350 million, of which $332 million was mobilized through the issue of bonds to 
institutional investors. 
Originally the ﬁnancing was expected to be completed by 1991, but long term 
ﬁnancing was difﬁcult to secure, largely due to the projected negative cash ﬂow during 
the start-up period. These difﬁculties resulted in a delay in the commencement of the 
construction by 3 years (from 1991 to 1994). The ﬁnancial prospects of the project were 
so weak that, at the ground breaking ceremony, Virginia’s Lieutenant Governor told the 
900 spectators that “this project has been pronounced dead more often than Elvis has been 
seen alive”. 
In spite of these difﬁculties, the ﬁnances were arranged, and the construction 
started in 1994 and was completed in 1995. However, as predicted, the project company 
encountered a ﬁnancial problem due to the lower-than-expected trafﬁc level. While the 
original estimate of the average trafﬁc was 35,000 vehicles per day, the trafﬁc level realized 
in 1996 was only 8,500 vehicles per day, with an average toll of $1.77. Having seen this 
lower than expected trafﬁc, the project company reduced the tolls to $1.00. This triggered 
an immediate jump in ridership to 23,000 vehicles per day. However, since this level of 
trafﬁc was still much lower than that originally anticipated, the project failed to generate 
adequate revenue. In 1996 the project company began to default, which eventually led to 
the renegotiation of the terms of bonds issued to ﬁnance the project. One of the reasons 
for this ﬁnancial problem in the initial stages was an underestimate of the negative impact 
of an alternative route, Route 7, which runs almost parallel to the project road, around 6-7 
km to the north.
However, more recently, the prospects have improved because Route 7 has again 
become congested. Trafﬁc reached the originally anticipated level in late 1990s, and a 
large reﬁnancing package was rearranged in 1999. Senior bonds received a stable rating 
from Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. Furthermore, the ﬁrst 6 kilometers of the road were 
widened from four lane to six lane standards in 2001. The project has now ﬁnally been 
regarded a success. 
This experience clearly describes the type of problem that toll road projects are 
likely to encounter, i.e. ﬁnancial difﬁculties during the initial period of operations. Once 
this problem is overcome, a project is likely to succeed since the trafﬁc may pick up over 
a few years to the level necessary for proﬁtable operations. 
Another example of PFI in the United States is Orange Country’s State Route 91 
Express Lanes. In the early 1990s, the cash-strapped Orange County in California resorted 
to a PFI to provide a needed expansion of the Riverside Freeway. The county government 
agreed with a concessionaire for the development of a 16 km tollway in the middle of the 
congested Riverside Freeway, running from Anaheim to Riverside. Motorists could use 
the private lanes to get relief from the congestion by paying up to $8 for a round trip. The 
construction was completed in the mid-1990s. Immediately after the service commenced, 
the Express Lanes reached a level close to congestion at peak times, but the users of the 
Riverside Freeway still continued to experience enormous congestion. The project was 
regarded as ﬁnancially successful, but it was a failure in resolving the ever worsening 
trafﬁc congestion of Riverside Freeway. Expansion of the Freeway was made more 
difﬁcult due to the county government’s acceptance of a clause that prevented any further 
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expansion of the Riverside Freeway until 2035. Too much enthusiasm in concluding this 
kind of deal sometimes leads to this type of misjudgment. 
Over the last few years, there appears to be major resurgence of PFIs in US. There 
are reports of a number of highways being developed under BOT schemes. 
(4) The Chinese experience
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen Superhighway Project was a green ﬁeld project connecting 
two key cities in Guangzhou Province, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, by 123 km of six-
lane expressway. The total cost of the project was originally estimated to be $1.6 billion. 
While the project was a 50/50 joint venture between Guangzhou Provincial Highway 
Construction Company (a 100% state-owned construction company) and Hopewell 
China Development Company (a 100% privately-owned company), it was essentially 
a private venture initiated by Gordon Wu, a founder of Hopewell Group. The project 
was non-solicited. The concession was signed in February 1988; construction started in 
August 1988; ﬁnancial closure followed in January 1991; and the project was completed 
in December 1993. A salient feature of this project is the accord of the right to develop real 
estate along the Superhighway as a part of the concession. The Guangzhou Government 
had allowed Hopewell China Development Company, a shareholder of the project 
company, to invest in real estate assets under certain conditions. 
At the outset of the Project, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai Superhighway 
Company was created as an SPC owned by the above two ﬁrms. The SPC estimated that 
the highway would become proﬁtable immediately since the trip between these two cities 
could be made two hours shorter than on the existing National Highway 107. However, 
the trafﬁc did not pick up as fast as anticipated. This was largely due to the underestimate 
of the potential impact of an alternative route, NH 107, whose level of toll was one third of 
that of the project road. The project also experienced a delay in construction (which meant 
the loss of an early construction bonus of $129 million) due to the delay in acquiring land 
for real estate development. The cost overrun, which reached $718, million, was another 
major problem. For these reasons, the project encountered major ﬁnancial difﬁculties, 
but these were ultimately resolved by the intervention of the Hopewell Group. The trafﬁc 
eventually reached 71,000 vehicles per day in 1997, which exceeded the original estimate 
of 30,000 vehicles per day. 
A key lesson to be learned from this project is the need to estimate properly the 
negative impact of the competing roads. The project sponsors had underestimated this 
impact. Another lesson is the risk associated with the real estate business. This side 
business may increase the attractiveness of the project, but it enormously increases the 
risk factor of the project. Land acquisition for real estate development often fuels a 
speculative movement and results in a higher cost of land acquisition. The development 
of highways which are essentially public goods should not be mixed together with real 
estate development activities which are essentially of a commercial nature. The latter 
creates different kinds of risks for the highway development in question, though the 
development of public roadside rest areas and amenity facilities could be an exception to 
this principle. 
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Major Issues encountered in BOT development for highways
BOT projects often encounter several types of problems including the following. 
(1) Difﬁculty in securing the long term ﬁnancing
For banks, construction projects are a major risk factor. Until some tangible assets are 
created, there is nothing to secure the payback of their loans, and thus they are reluctant 
to offer long term ﬁnancing to the project company. Even in the case of the Chilean 
program where the investment environment is relatively favorable in comparison with 
other developing countries, only three out of twelve concessions were able to obtain 
long term ﬁnance, and only under the sponsors’ guarantee of payback (limited recourse 
ﬁnancing). This has necessitated many project companies to arrange for some form of 
bridge ﬁnancing. Bridge ﬁnance often requires an increase of the equity portion of the 
debt so as to provide lenders with extra comfort. This would again make the project more 
costly. 
A problem of short term loans is the ability to reﬁnance. The project company will 
be exposed to the scrutiny of banks at the time of the greatest ﬁnancial difﬁculty, i.e. the 
initial operating period when the cash ﬂow is much lower than required for debt service. 
As shown in Dulles Greenway Project, the project companies often start defaulting at 
the time of the commencement of operations, when the period of grace for medium term 
loans is ﬁnished and interest starts to be paid. A possible solution to this problem is the 
government provision of a minimum revenue guarantee. This would immensely facilitate 
reﬁnancing. While India has not yet adopted this guarantee, many governments such as 
Chile and Korea have already done so. Serious consideration should be given to this 
possibility elsewhere. 
There are two impediments to the adoption of the minimum revenue guarantee. 
One is the difﬁculty associated with trafﬁc projections, which will be discussed in the 
next paragraph. Another is the government’s reluctance to assume contingency liability, a 
practice generally discouraged by ﬁscal authorities. 
(2) Tendency to overstate the future trafﬁc
Trafﬁc projection presents the greatest risk for toll road projects. There is a clear tendency 
for trafﬁc to be overstated. For instance, the Guangzhou-Shengzhen Superhighway Project 
projected twice as much trafﬁc as the level actually realized. In the case of the Dulles 
Greenway Project, only a quarter of the estimated trafﬁc was realized. Faced with this 
lower than expected trafﬁc, the project company lowered the toll from $1.77 to $1.00. 
This resulted in an increase in trafﬁc by 140%, but it was still one third lower than the 
original estimate. The most difﬁcult part of the trafﬁc projection is the estimation of the 
downward impact of tolls. While there are a few established techniques for estimating 
impact of tolls such as “stated and inferred preference surveys,” these techniques alone 
will not be sufﬁcient unless the possible impact of alternative routes on the project roads 
is fully taken into account. The business prospectus for a BOT project tends to understate 
the negative impact of these alternative roads on the project roads.
There are a couple of ways to deal with this trafﬁc projection problem. One is to 
engage a reputable transport consultant to carry out the trafﬁc projection on a network 
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basis, rather than on the project-by-project or section-by-section basis. Current practice 
in India and other developing countries is that the trafﬁc forecast should be carried out 
by a design and engineering consultant as a part of the feasibility study, with minimum 
allocation of time and funds for this exercise. This obviously does not provide potential 
investors with any reliable basis for judgment of the viability of the project. What they 
need is a trafﬁc forecast carried out by a specialized consultant with a high professional 
reputation. Another approach is the adoption of the “least present value of revenue” 
approach. This would be an effective way to deal with situations where reliable trafﬁc 
projections are not available. 
However, the problem of the tendency to overstate trafﬁc should not be overemphasized 
since the original projected trafﬁc may eventuall be realized after a time lag of a few years. 
Toll roads will become fully utilized sooner or later, but the difﬁculty is to predict when 
this will happen. In other words, toll road projects are often not viable from a short term 
perspective, but if looked at from a longer term perspective, they often becomes viable. If 
the initial ﬁnancial difﬁculties resulting from the lower-than-projected trafﬁc are overcome 
with the necessary support from the government, the project is likely to become proﬁtable. 
Lessons learned 
A number of lessons can be learned from the global experience, including the followings: 
(1)  The need to tap the potential of foreign contractors
Because of the currency mismatch between the toll revenue and capital costs incurred in a 
foreign currency, foreign contractors are generally not interested in participating in large-
scale infrastructure projects in developing countries. However, the Chilean experience 
indicates the opposite. The government had originally expected that road concession 
projects would be led by Chilean ﬁnancial institutions with technical support from 
domestic contractors. What happened in Chile was that many of the concession projects 
were constructed by foreign contractors. This indicates that foreign contractors will come 
if a conducive environment exists. 
Another important factor in attracting foreign contractors is the size of the investment. 
Because of the high transaction costs associated with BOT projects in foreign countries, 
the size of the investment should be large enough to absorb high transaction costs. The 
current size of BOT investments in many developing countries ranges from $50 million to 
$200 million, which is too small to attract internationally reputable contractors. The usual 
size of internationally tendered BOT projects ranges from $200 million to $500 million, 
and it can be even greater than this. For instance, the size of Malaysia’s North South 
Corridor BOT Project was $3.2 billion and that of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Superhighway 
Project was $2.1 billion. It is true that, as the size of the project increases, the complexity 
of the project also increases. However, if the size of the envisaged program is large, as 
seen in India, it is important for the government to consider substantially scaling up the 
size of individual investments. This would also enable the transfer of technologies in the 
concession market. 
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(2) Importance of standardization
There are two approaches in designing a BOT project; (i) an innovation oriented approach; 
and (ii) a standardization oriented approach. Unlike the traditional “item-rate contract,” 
the BOT can encourage innovation by transferring the responsibilities for design and 
pricing schedule to the private sector. As an example, the US SR-91 Project took the 
ﬁrst approach. The call for proposals did not include the preliminary design. Bidders 
were supposed to submit their own design proposals. They were also allowed to propose 
their own pricing schedule, including some innovative elements such as congestion 
pricing. This means that they could pursue a proﬁt maximization strategy, as long as 
their return on investment did not exceed 17%, a ceiling set by the Federal Government. 
The disadvantage of this approach is the difﬁculty of comparing the various bids in an 
objective manner, since each bid is different in terms of design and pricing. Difﬁculty 
in comparison will not only make the selection process more complicated but also can 
potentially open up for a room for political intervention. Negotiations tend to take much 
longer because many contractual items need to be agreed in advance. 
In contrast, in the case of Chile’s South Access to Concepcion Project, the government 
prepared the preliminary design of the roads. In addition, maximum limits were set for 
toll rates (indexed to inﬂation). All bidders were competing on the basis of identical 
design and operational speciﬁcations. This enabled the government to select bidders 
in a faster and more transparent manner. The time for the negotiations was very short. 
The project companies had, however, little chance for improvement of the government’s 
preliminary design, even if they could. As demonstrated above, a trade-off exists between 
the innovation oriented approach and the standardization oriented approach. While the 
former may be applied to complex “green-ﬁeld” projects, the latter ﬁts straightforward 
“brown-ﬁeld” projects better. For India, the latter approach would deﬁnitely be better. 
(3) Need to avoid renegotiation
In the course of the BOT processing, granting agencies tend to pay little attention to 
the possible cases of renegotiation at a later stage. The real cost of a BOT concession 
cannot be measured until the BOT project has been transferred back to the government. 
Global experience indicates that BOT projects tend to entail a much higher incidence of 
renegotiations than expected. A study by J. Luis Guasch found that over 60% of 1,000 
concession contracts awarded in the 1990s in Latin America were renegotiated within three 
years. In the case of high proﬁle and lucrative projects, the competition is so tense that 
bidders are tempted to offer below-cost prices to win, in anticipation of later adjustments 
to the bid price through renegotiation. Politically well connected contractors often take 
this course of. If they fail to renegotiate, the project company will default. If the bidder 
succeeds in renegotiation, it is at a cost for the taxpayers. An effective way to prevent 
this from happening is the “least present value of revenue” (LPVR) scheme under which 
the concession period can be extended until the project company can recover the project 
cost plus a minimum proﬁt. Other methods of minimizing the possibility of renegotiation 
include setting a minimum level of tolls or grant for bids so as to prevent below-cost bids. 
However, this requires thorough preparation of the bidding documents including accurate 
estimates of costs and future revenue. These are not easy tasks for any clients. A way that 
can be recommended to prevent the abuse of renegotiation is to detail the circumstances 
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which would trigger renegotiation. 
(4) The importance of careful planning and a phased approach for PPP program implementation
As clearly demonstrated by the Mexican experience, lack of planning can result in major 
failure, costing the nation an enormous amount. However, if they is planned well, BOT 
schemes can bring major beneﬁts to the country as demonstrated by Chilean experience. 
A key element of the Chilean success is its phased approach, with necessary modiﬁcations 
and improvements being added to the concession schemes over the years. If the Mexican 
government had adopted a similar approach, it might have been able to avoid such a major 
failure. However, because of the pressure to demonstrate a visible impact before the next 
election, the then administration had no choice other than concluding all contracts in a 
short period of time and getting construction started. This provides major lessons for 
India on the importance of a phased strategy which would allow the government to adjust 
its approach in mid-course, and achieve its objective at a minimum cost to the nation. 
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